Space AND THE Body Politic

INTRODUCTION

How can we have been misled into thinking 'the social' and 'the educational' without the consideration of space? The notion of space and the politics of space implicitly enter into conceptions of 'the public' and 'the body' (the body politic). The public is inherently spatial, referring to the structure and the morphology of a shared place, reflecting a materiality. Public spaces exist in many different forms; boulevards, parks and gardens but also cafes, malls, markets and city centres. These spaces can be also enclosed spaces of public institutions such as universities, schools and libraries. In education, the question of public space cannot be separated from the question of literature, considered as a public institution. Jürgen Habermas has written of the development of the 'public sphere'—a developing public space that is intimately connected to the logic of democracy and citizenship, and hence, public debate and participation. As Michael Davie has argued 'Public space is the sphere of the *polis,* as opposed to the *oikos,* which is proper to each individual. At a different scale, it can also be the space of the State, that of political power, that of the relationship between the State and the population.'[1]

It is also important to distinguish between the exploration of space as a sociological issue—the spatial dimensions of social processes—and the theoretical use of spatial master metaphors. Silber (1995) comments on the increasing currency of

spatial metaphors—'fields,' 'space,' 'boundaries'—in contemporary sociological thinking, from Marx's infrastructure/superstructure distinction, Simmel's 'social distance and proximity,' Sorokin's forgotten idea of sociocultural space, to Giddens (1984) 'structuration theory,' as the 'first systematic incorporation of space, both physical and social, into a theory of general sociological character' (Silber, 1995). She focuses, first, upon Pierre Bourdieu's (1985a,b; 1989) influential conceptions of social space and field(s) as the strongest theoretical use of spatial metaphors in sociological theory. Secondly, she discusses Harrison White's (1992) *Identity and Control* as the first systematic statement of 'network theory,' before examining what she calls 'weaker' usages of spatial metaphors and the theoretical logic of spatial metaphors. Silber (1995) concludes that spatial metaphors have begun to displace constructs and metaphors emblematic of positivism while also reflecting the prevalent distrust of any kind of encompassing and totalising paradigm.

The point at which temporality slid into spatial, so to speak, marked a radical break with the Enlightenment and the belief in continuous progress. This was accompanied by a radical decentering of the subject and the Cartesian/Kantian conception of knowledge which had set up the aspatial problem set of modern philosophy but which had echoes of the Western tradition initiated by Plato. Modern philosophy inherited a series of distinctions—reality/appearance, mind/body, morality/prudence, scheme/content—that denied temporality but also, in a different way, spatiality. The philosophy of the body that developed out of phenomenology and became strongly evident in the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Simone de Beauvoir and Jean-Paul Sartre, emphasized the fact that bodies inhabit space but that they do not do so as objects. Martin Heidegger dealt explicitly with the notion of space as a secondary aspect of his ontology, ultimately dependent on temporality, and Michel Foucault acknowledged the inherent political nature of space.

The shift from an anthropocentric view and the Enlightenment ideology of continuous progress can be found in the seeds of revolutionary thinking at the end of the nineteenth century in 'new scientific thought, pictorial perspective, and writing, all of which favored discontinuity and deconstruction.' Dosse (1997, p. 356) explains further what he calls 'temporality slides into spatiality' by reference to 'the sounding of the postmodern hour' in the history of structuralism:

> From the arbitrariness of the Sausserean sign to the new mathematical and physical models to quantum theory to the Impressionist's dislocation of the classical perspective, followed by that of the Cubists, a new vision of the world imposed discontinuity: the referent was held at bay . . .

> Historical consciousness was repressed by a planetary, topographical consciousness [Lacan's dictum that the unconscious is structured like a language]. Temporality shifted into spatial. Being removed from the natural order gave way to a search for unvarying logics born of the nature/culture conjoining (Dosse, 1997, pp. 356–57)

The 'cooled' relationship to temporality characterised structuralist commitments to synchrony over diachrony, atemporal or a new kind of spatiality that entered contemporary theory in terms of the structures of mind, society, culture, knowledge and history itself. Yet the Nietzschean-Heideggerian roots of poststructuralism in the early 1960s began to question these commitments. Poststructuralism, as a specifically *philosophical* response to the alleged scientific status of structuralism—to its status as a megaparadigm for the social sciences—and as a movement which, under the inspiration of Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, and others, sought to decenter the 'structures,' systematicity and scientific status of structuralism, to critique its underlying metaphysics and to extend it a number of different directions, while at the same time preserving central elements of structuralism's critique of the humanist subject (see Peters, 1999b).

This chapter builds upon earlier work in this area (Peters, 1996b) which outlined an 'architecture of resistance' in educational theory, examining in turn, geographical space and what Peters called 'the postmodernisation of education,' architectural space, especially in relation to Foucault's work on institutional enclosure and the hope of a 'critical regionalism,' and, finally, what Peters, following Deleuze, called 'networked spaces of societies of control.' In particular, Peters was interested in following Deleuze and Foucault, in mapping the new open spaces of education, based on processes of free-floating control that characterised the shifts from disciplinary to control societies, from closed to open systems. He ended with a plea to take the politics of space seriously and, in particular, to investigate the way that the new spatiality was, above all, a questioning of historicism and historicist assumptions in educational thinking. He also emphasized that the politics of space is based upon the way in which space is fundamental to the exercise of power. We can appreciate Foucault's insight by postulating the relationships between space and power at the macrolevel (witness the new global political economy of education based on the open system); at the mesolevel (in terms of the rearrangement of institutional spaces); and at the microlevel (in relation to 'the classroom' or the 'lecture theatre').

However, this chapter takes a different tack by reviewing work that explores a Heideggerian-Foucauldian line of thinking (see Elden, 2001) seeking to develop this perspective for a reconsideration of space as an essential part of critical pedagogic practices. The chapter begins from an examination of Heidegger's work to consider the importance of space in relation to the understanding of time, history and Being. Heidegger's *ontology of space* in relation to *Dasein* is a prominent theme in his later philosophy, one that is crucial to understanding his critique of modern technology and of modernity in general. It provides an important set of considerations not only for understanding pedagogy in modernity but also for understanding pedagogical practice in relation to the contemporary technologization of education and,

in particular, various technological forms of education, including distance education. The chapter explores the question of spatial ontology in relation to Hubert Dreyfus' (2002) *On the Internet*, as an exemplification of the critical issues it raises for pedagogy.

In the next section, the chapter investigates the Heidegger-Foucault connection and Foucault's (1986b) 'Of Other Spaces' as a basis for reconceptualising the relation between power, knowledge and the body. Foucault demonstrates the relations between power, knowledge and the body in spatial terms and by reference to disciplinary societies based upon forms of enclosure. The body occupies space; as opposed to the nonmaterialisation of the mind, the body has a temporal-spatial location. It is an analysis of the body that must become the basis for pedagogical practices that are critical. The body has recently become a desideratum for a range of disparate studies in the arts, humanities and the sciences for a philosophical rescue operation that aims—against the dualisms bedevilling modern philosophy elevating the mind at the expense of the body, and temporality over space—to rehabilitate the body as a site for reason, perception, knowledge and learning. This re-evaluation has been driven by a range of factors: the attempt to overcome the dualism of mind/body metaphysics (Wittgenstein, Dewey, Heidegger); the re-surfacing of a phenomenology of the body (Sartre, de Beauvoir, Merleau-Ponty) in the continuing rapprochement of so-called analytic and continental philosophy; the movement within continental philosophy that emphasises the finitude, temporality, and corporeality of the self (Heidegger) and, also, the historizing of questions of ontology (Nietzsche, Foucault); and, the development of feminist philosophies where embodiedness, especially in relation to sex and gender, have played a central role (see Peters, 2002b).

Finally, the chapter explores the implications of this line of argument for geographies of resistance in critical pedagogic practices. The argument, then, is at one and the same time an explication of the importance of space and an analysis of space in terms of Heidegger's ontology, Dreyfus' phenomenology of learning, and Foucault's analysis of disciplinary societies.

HEIDEGGER AND THE SPATIAL ONTOLOGY OF BEING

The notion of 'dwelling,' which represents Heidegger's reappraisal of the concept of space in relation to Dasein, appears in two late essays 'Building Dwelling Thinking' and ' . . . Poetically Man Dwells . . . ' (Heidegger, 1971). Julian Young (2002, p. 63) identifies three phenomena, what he calls after Heidegger, 'the loss of the gods, the violence of technology, and homelessness, the loss of dwelling' as the destitution or sickness of modernity. Modern technology conquers space, abolish-

ing 'remoteness.' At the same time, paradoxically, in its 'abolition of remoteness,' technology brings about a profound 'distancing' from things and the world. As Malpas (2000, pp. 205–6) explains:

> Although technology is, as Heidegger acknowledges, a *mode* of disclosedness or revealing, its particular 'en-framing' of things also entails a covering-over of things as they extend beyond the technological frame: within the domain of the technological, things are disclosed, not as *things,* but as *resources, material,* or '*stock*' ('*Bestand*'—often translated as 'standing-reserve')—as commodities to be transformed, stored, and consumed in a way that obliterates difference and renders everything in a one-dimensional sameness.

Thus through modern technology the world is reduced to a uniform system of consumable resources and while disclosedness or revealing still occurs, it is hidden from us. Disclosedness is only possible through a certain form of being-in-the-world or 'dwelling' in which things are revealed to us in their complex embeddedness in the world. The problem is that technology threatens this possibility of 'dwelling' and the disclosedness of the world. Not surprisingly, Young maintains 'dwelling can plausibly be said to constitute the central topic of the thinking of the late Heidegger' (Young, 2000, pp. 187–88).

Malpas (2000) claims spatiality plays a central role both in Heidegger's critique of modern technology (and modernity) and also in his account of being-in-the-world (dwelling). Yet in Heidegger's early work *Being and Time* (1961 [orig. 1927]) spatiality is both derived from and considered as secondary to temporality. Malpas (2000) following Dreyfus' (1991) influential account claims that Heidegger is confused. Heidegger, Dreyfus argues, confuses two senses of 'Being-in' when he coins the term 'Being-in-the-world': a spatial sense (as 'in a box'—'inclusion' or 'containment') and an existential sense ('in the army,' 'in love,' 'involvement'). The spatial sense Heidegger understands in a characteristically modern sense due to Descartes, as bodily extension. Dreyfus' criticism is that Heidegger fails to distinguish '*public* space from the centered spatiality of each *individual* human being': the former operates as a field of presence—the condition for things being near or far—which is to be distinguished from the latter, based upon Dasein's pragmatic use of things (Dreyfus, 1992, p. 129). Equipmentality—the referential ordering of things within a field of activity—thus for Dreyfus is 'a publicly available structure, that is also based in communal interaction and articulation' (Malpas, 2000, p. 219). Equipmentality is a technical term used by Heidegger to denote the relational totality and ordering of things, as 'ready-to-hand' or available, that structure a field of activity.

The central difficulty is that the early Heidegger derives spatiality from temporality and can only offer an impoverished sense of space. He is therefore unable to offer a consistent account of space or locatedness, which Malpas claims is direct-

ly tied to his inadequate treatment of the body. Rather than talking of space or spatiality, by contrast, Malpas suggests that we adopt the notion of *place* 'as a structure that encompasses . . . both spatial and temporal structures as well as structures deriving from the equipmental and the social' (Malpas, 2000, p. 222). Extending Heidegger's line of argument, Malpas explains that within technological modernity, the spatial ordering of things is disturbed so that the difference between the near and far becomes obliterated. Technological disclosedness or revealing, thus covers over things: 'it replaces the things themselves with images or representations . . . of things—that is, it re-presents things within a particular 'frame' and in a way that is abstracted from their original locatedness' (Malpas, 2000, p. 226). Malpas argues that the technological shift from locateness to dislocation, from things to representations, has a number of long-term and appalling consequences:

> Inasmuch as technology covers over the concrete locatedness of both human being and worldly object, it covers over the nature of both human and the thing. As a result, technology leads us to misunderstand the character of our own being-in-the-world as well as the mode of being of the things with which we are engaged. In this respect, inasmuch as technology removes us from our proper place, obliterating any proper sense of place, it also covers our own mortality—a mortality that can itself be viewed as essentially connected to the place-bound character of our being (Malpas, 2000, pp. 226–27).

While seeming to be amenable to human control, modern technology increasingly enframes us as resources, transforming the character of human experience, reducing it to re-presentation and narrowing our sensitivity to a small range of sensory and interactive modalities, rather than engaging the body and its multiple senses in its entirety (see also Malpas, 1999). These Heideggerian observations are of overwhelming importance to pedagogy and to critical pedagogical practices (see Peters, 2002c). They provide not only the basis for a philosophical account of the critical importance of space and the body to pedagogy and an implicit critique of a traditional pedagogy that has all but ignored the body (space) or privileged it over mind (atemporality), but also they contain within them pedagogical critique of a technological modernity aimed at the efficient delivery of information via a model of distance education. Let us examine this line of argument further by reference to the work of Hubert Dreyfus.

PLATONISM, BODY TALK AND NIHILISM:
DREYFUS' *ON THE INTERNET*

This section draws on a review of Dreyfus' work (see Peters, 2002a). Hubert Dreyfus' (2001) *On the Internet* is at one and the same time, philosophical, post-Nietzschean and also 'computer literate' or, better, computer sensitive. He begins and

ends, (uncharacteristically for Dreyfus), by quoting Nietzsche on the body, from *Thus Spake Zarathrustra:* beginning—'Behind your thoughts and feelings, my brother, there stands a mighty ruler, an unknown sage—whose name is self. In your body he dwells; he is your body' and ending—'I want to speak to the despisers of the body. I would not have them learn and teach differently, but merely say farewell to their own bodies—and thus become silent.' Therein, is encapsulated Dreyfus' thesis on the Internet, as he succinctly sums it up in the final paragraphs:

> as long as we continue to affirm our bodies, the Net can be useful to us in spite of its tendency to offer the worst of a series of asymmetric trade-offs: economy over efficiency in education, the virtual over the real in our relation to things and people, and anonymity over commitment in our lives. But, in using it, we have to remember that our culture has already fallen twice for the Platonic/Christian temptation to try to get rid of our vulnerable bodies, and has ended in nihilism. This time around we must resist this temptation and affirm our bodies, not in spite of their finitude and vulnerability, but because, without our bodies, as Nietzsche saw, we would be literally nothing (Dreyfus, 2001, pp. 106–7).

It is a thesis as powerful as it is frightening, as simple and elegant as it is prophetic. The Net as a kind of technological *enframing* of being stands at the door. It contains both the danger and the saving power. If we allow it to transcend the limits of the body we will also allow it to abstract from our moods, our cultural location and belongingness, our finitude and vulnerability, our animality that helps comprise our linguistic and cultural identities, and also the meaning we give our lives. By leaving the body behind we will succumb to the same nihilistic impulses in our culture that began with Platonism and was repeated by Christianity. Dreyfus thus lines up behind Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, a group of philosophers who were dedicated to overcoming the dualisms ruling Cartesian thought and who argued for a phenomenology of the body.

The idea that the soul is distinct from the body has it roots in classical Greek philosophy and is found in Plato. For instance, in the *Meno,* Plato indicates that the soul acquires knowledge before it enters the body and thus all knowing consists in recollecting. Later, in the *Phaedo* and other dialogues Plato articulates the notion of Forms that are considered eternal, changeless and incorporeal. The Platonic dualism between the world of Forms and the world of mere appearances becomes one of the problem sets in the history of philosophy. Gilbert Ryle said that all Western philosophy consists in a series of footnotes to Plato and, indeed, one can detect in the history of contemporary philosophy the antagonism between Platonism and anti-Platonism as a dominant theme. Anti-Platonists or antifoundationalists is a convenient category that refers to a group of philosophers—phenomenologists, pragmatists and post-Nietzscheans—who want to give up on a set of dualisms (appearance/reality, body/mind, made/found, sensible/intellectual) that have dominated the history of Western philosophy. On the basis of these dualisms Platonists

and Kantians have argued for an unchanging and ahistorical human nature that can serve as the foundation for universal moral obligations.

Platonism, thus, in educational philosophy stands for the elevation and privileging of the mind or intellect over the body: it stands for a host of optional metaphors that serve to dualize or bifurcate reason and emotion, metaphors, in their application and formalisation, have become the substance of educational practice. Perhaps, the most culturally deeply embedded dualism with which educational theory and practice must come to terms with is the mind/body separation. This dualism historically has developed as an instrument of 'othering': of separating boys from girls, reason from emotion, minorities from the dominant culture, and classes from each other. It nests within a family of related dualisms and remains one of the most trenchant and resistant problems of education in postmodernity.

The same underlying philosophical problem set is at issue in Dreyfus' *On the Internet.* The body is everything. Dreyfus argues 'loss of embodiment would lead to *loss of the ability to recognize relevance*' and, most importantly for learning, that 'Without involvement and presence *we cannot acquire skills*' (Dreyfus, 2001, p.7). In short, our bodies matter; they provide the 'source of our sense of our grip on reality' (Dreyfus, 2001, p. 7). He quotes Merleau-Ponty, thus: 'The body is our general medium for having a world.' Of course, Dreyfus is no stranger to Merleau-Ponty or to Heidegger or Kierkegaard, for that matter. His account of the acquisition of skill is indebted to Merleau-Ponty and his commentary on Heidegger (Dreyfus, 1991) has now become a standard. He is a long-standing critic of computer ideologies and, in particular, the cognitive science modelling of the brain on the computer in books like *What Computers Can't Do* and *What Computers Still Can't Do* (Dreyfus, 1992; see also Dreyfus, 1982). In *Mind over Machine* (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986) he argued that where human beings begin learning a new skill by understanding and carrying out its rules as a novice, only to leave rules behind as they become expert, the best that a computer can attain is a sort of 'competence' that consists in carrying out the rules it has been taught, albeit very quickly and reliably. A version of this argument appears in *On the Internet.* Indeed, Dreyfus outlines the stages by which a student learns—novice, advanced beginner, competence, proficiency, expertise, practical wisdom. Dreyfus' major conclusion is that disembodied learning can only ever attain the stage of mere competence and will not achieve the stage of self-mastery or practical wisdom (see also Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1985). Questions of space and the body, of the location and place of the learner and teacher, are, thus, crucially germane to the phenomenology of learning, as they determine questions of *locatedness, situatedness,* and, therefore, also broader notions of identity, at the personal, national and cultural levels.

FOUCAULT'S SPACES OF POWER

> We are in an epoch where space takes for us the form of relations among sites. (Michael Foucault, 1994, IV, p. 754).

The analysis of space was always important to Foucault although he wrote little directly on this topic except for his essay 'Of Other Spaces' (Foucault, 1986b). Foucault was to maintain that space is inherently political and that is it is fundamental to any exercise of power. Under the influence of Heidegger, the French epistemologist Gaston Bachelard, and the movement of structuralism, more generally, Foucault provided us with a history of present that recast genealogy as a historical ontology, a form of *spatialised history,* rather than merely a history of space (Elden, 2001, p. 6). An equally important aspect of Foucault's analysis of space is his emphasis on the materiality of the body, which echoes Heidegger's criticism of Nietzsche, in that Foucault abandons 'the simple equation of the body with an 'I,' an 'ego' or a self.' By contrast, 'Foucault concentrates on the question of the body without the subjectivism; instead there is an investigation of how the subjection of the body forms the subject' (Elden, 2001, p. 104).

For Foucault, every social space is structured by power and invested with knowledge. In a late interview he remarks that in the eighteenth century there emerges a specific political discourse, which reflects upon architecture 'as a function of the aims and techniques of the government of societies' (Foucault, 1984, p. 239). Cities and buildings became spatial models for government rationality. They provided the basis for the exercise of social control and manipulation. The school, for example, is considered as a form of disciplinary architecture demonstrating at an abstract level the relation between educational space and a particular form of disciplinary political rationality that produces an *individualized* subject.

Foucault painstakingly documents the histories of different institutional spaces: the clinic, the prison, the school. In *Discipline and Punish,* for instance, Foucault observes how 'disciplinary power' depends upon 'a politics of space.'

> A whole problematic then develops: that of an architecture that is no longer built simply to be seen (as with the ostentation of palaces), or to observe the external space (cf. the geometry of fortresses), but to permit an internal, articulated and detailed control—to render visible those who are inside it; in more general terms, an architecture that would operate to transform individuals: to act on those it shelters, to provide a hold on their conduct, to carry the effects of power right to them, to make it possible to know them, to alter them (Foucault, 1977, p. 72).

Disciplinary power based on the instruments of observation, judgement and examination are enabled by a carefully designed institutional architecture permitting total surveillance: the hospital building is organized as 'an instrument of medical action';

the prison is built as a 'space of confinement'; the school building is organized as a spatial mechanism for training of the individual, for individualization. He calls it 'a pedagogical machine' (p. 172).

In *Discipline and Punish,* the section on 'discipline' is organised into three sections, respectively 'docile bodies,' 'the means of correct training' and 'panopticism.' It includes an account of the ways that during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the disciplines became general formulas of domination. Foucault claims that this new political anatomy was evidenced in a multiplicity of often-minor processes at different locations that eventually coalesced into a general method:

> They [i.e., disciplinary techniques] were at work in secondary education at a very early date, later in primary schools; they slowly invested the space of the hospital; and, in a few decades, they restructured the military organization (Foucault, 1977, p. 138).

Foucault talks of disciplinary techniques in terms of 'the art of distributions,' (the monastic model of enclosure became the most perfect educational regime and 'partitioning' (every individual had his or her own place). 'The rule of *functional sites*' refers to the ways that architects designed space to correspond to the need to supervise and to prevent 'dangerous communication.' Foucault argues 'the organization of a serial space was one of the great technical mutations of elementary education' (Foucault, 1977, p. 147) that made it possible to supersede the traditional apprenticeship system where the pupil spends a few minutes with the master while the rest of the group remains idle.

Foucault also details 'the control of activities,' including the timetable, what he calls 'the temporal elaboration of the act' (e.g., marching), and the correlation of the body and the gesture (e.g., 'good handwriting . . . presupposes a gymnastics'), as well as other aspects. He writes:

> To sum up, it might be said that discipline creates out of the bodies it controls four types of individuality, or rather an individuality that is endowed with four characteristics; it is cellular (by play of spatial distribution), it is organic (by the coding of activities), it is genetic (by the accumulation of time), it is combinatory (by the composition of forces). And, in doing so, it operates four great techniques; it draws up tables; it prescribes movements; it imposes exercises; lastly, in order to obtain the combination of forces, it arranges 'tactics' (Foucault, 1977, p. 167).

He discusses the means of correct training in terms of 'hierarchical observation.' As he suggests 'the school building was to be a mechanism for training . . . a 'pedagogical machine,' normalizing judgement (Foucault, 1977, p. 172). The examination 'transformed the economy of visibility into the exercise of power,' introduced 'individuality into the field of documentation,' and 'surrounded by all its documentary techniques, . . . [made] each individual a 'case'' (Foucault, 1977, p. 187f). Most famously, Foucault, discusses 'panopticism'—a system of surveillance, based on

Jeremy Bentham's architectural figure, that operates by permitting the relentless and continual observation of inmates at the periphery by officials at the center, without their ever being seen.

Discipline and Punish is concerned with the operation of technologies of power and their relations to the emergence of knowledge in the form of new discourses, based around modes of objectification through which human beings became subjects. It is a theme that Foucault develops further in his work on the history of sexuality. Foucault asks:

> Why has sexuality been so widely discussed and what has been said about it? What were the effects of power generated by what was said? What are the links between these discourses, these effects of power, and the pleasures that were invested by them? What knowledge was formed as a result of this linkage? (Foucault, 1980a, p. 11).

It is in the course of his inquiries into sexuality and the proliferation of associated discourses that Foucault coins the term 'bio-power' considered as a kind of anatomo-politics of the human body and control of the population at large.

Hubert Dreyfus' (1996) begins his essay 'Being and Power: Heidegger and Foucault' with the following comparison between the two thinkers:

> At the heart of Heidegger's thought is the notion of being, and the same could be said of power in the works of Foucault. The history of being gives Heidegger a perspective from which to understand how in our modern world *things* have been turned into *objects*. Foucault transforms Heidegger's focus on *things* to a focus on *selves* and how they became *subjects*. And, just as Heidegger offers a history of being, culminating in the technological understanding of being, in order to help us understand and overcome our current way of dealing with things as objects and resources, Foucault analyzes several regimes of power, culminating in modern bio-power, in order to help us free ourselves from understanding ourselves as subjects (Dreyfus, 1996, p. 1).

In contrast to Platonism and in line with the trajectory of contemporary French philosophy Foucault emphasises the enfleshed subject, sensuous reason, and the embodied subject—a subject, not timelessly cast as an abstract universalism as with the Kantian ethical subject or *homo economicus* of neoclassical economics, but one that emphasizes the everyday contingencies of the self and its understanding as the site of a dissociated self—a body normalised, individualised and inscribed with the effects of power.

While Dreyfus does not provide a point of comparison between Heidegger and Foucault specifically in relation to space, he does provide a useful analysis of their respective notions of resistance in relation to technology and bio-power.

> Neither Heidegger nor Foucault think that we can resist techno/bio-power directly because what ultimately needs to be resisted is not particular technologies nor particular strategies but rather a tendency in the practices towards ever greater order and flexibility that produces

> and sustains them. Thus the current understanding can only be resisted by first showing that it is not inevitable but is an interpretation of what it is to be, second by connecting our current style with our current discomfort and then by taking up marginal practices which have escaped or successfully resisted the spread of techno/bio-power (Dreyfus, 1996, p. 16).

Foucault, as Dreyfus explains, bases his notion of resistance on the self. His genealogical investigations and historical ontology leads him back to the ethics of self-mastery—a set of cultural practices of the self he finds in the writings of the Stoics that provide a basis to demonstrate that there are no universal necessities in human existence (that we could be otherwise), and, like Nietzsche, to question Christian asceticism, with its ethic of self-renunciation. In his last seminars given at Vermont and Berkeley in 1983, Foucault illustrates by reference to classical texts the form of an education, differently conceived at different times, based on truth-telling and a conception of self-mastery that integrates the *logos* with the *nomos* and the *bios* in practical ways that lead to a successful engagement with the world (see Peters, 2003). In terms of these variable practices of the self he is able to question the direction of our current practices, and to contemplate the possibility of resistance. In particular, he draws upon the question in antiquity of knowing how to govern one's life so as to give it the most beautiful form possible. Here the notions of the 'art of living,' 'care of the self' and 'aesthetics of existence' loom large and Heidegger's and Nietzsche's combined influence is again keenly felt, especially in the notion of life as a work of art. Ultimately it is in these 'practices of creativity' of the self that Foucault wants to ground the possibilities of resistance. Dreyfus comments:

> There is, nonetheless, an important kind of resistance these two thinkers [Heidegger and Foucault] share. Thinking the history of being, for Heidegger, and the genealogy of regimes of power, for Foucault, opens a space for critical questioning by showing that our understanding of reality need not be defined by techno/bio power—that we need not be dominated by the drive to order and optimize everything. They both show that we had a different relation to being and to power once, which suggests that we could have again. Thus an understanding of our historical condition weakens the hold our current understanding has on us and makes possible disengagement from the direction our practices are taking (Dreyfus, 1996, p. 16).

In one sense it could be argued that resistance for both Heidegger and Foucault is retrospective and based on a form of historical understanding that demonstrates that we could be otherwise than we are. Yet there are positive strategies and tactics of resistance as well to be gained from their work, which are important to mapping geographies of resistance in critical pedagogical practices. These forms of resistance crucially involve the body and the relations between the body and place, which also provide the ground for most discussions of identity, citizenship and the Other. Yet if we are to understand resistance in Foucauldian terms we must also understand that his conception of power *entails* resistance—resistance is a relation of power. Just as freedom is a necessary condition for relations of power, so it is for resistance.

Foucault does not accept the liberal juridical notion of power, which is grounded in sovereignty and opposed to authority. He understands power (and resistance) as something to be exercised rather than something to be possessed. Power is productive (as well as repressive), and it is diffuse, permeating the social body through multiple sites. On this model, then, where the very existence of power depends on points of resistance, critical pedagogical practices depend upon on an embodied engagement with the world, based on the ethic of self-mastery that seeks to 'recover' our own sense of place and the potential of modern technology to obliterate all difference.

GEOGRAPHIES OF RESISTANCE
IN CRITICAL PEDAGOGIC PRACTICES

In a recent essay John Morgan (2000) has argued for a 'critical pedagogy of space' where space is seen as a social construction. He suggests that 'space should not be seen simply as the product of capitalist social relationships, but tied up with other axes of power, such as gender, ethnicity and sexuality' and he ends by issuing the challenge to develop a critical pedagogy of space that reflects the multiple and contested nature of space (Morgan, 2000, p. 273). He emphasises, first, (and following the Marxian geographer, David Harvey, 'the way in which the production of space is linked with the exercise of economic power,' what in the context of globalisation Peters has called the 'postmodernisation of education.' He then considers space in relation to the school curriculum, especially geography, where he indicates 'different social groups may have distinct spatialities' (Morgan, 2000, p. 279), emphasising 'a shift away from the idea of space as homogenuous, continuous, objective, Cartesian and knowable, towards a view of space as fragmented, imaginative, unknowable and subjective' (Morgan, 2000, p. 281). He raises the possibility that 'a critical pedagogy of space might begin with an analysis of the gendered use of space in the classroom' and it might also pay attention to 'the experience of public space,' focusing on 'spaces of exclusion,' and 'geographies of resistance through which people deal with, and resist, oppressive practices' (Morgan, 2000, pp. 282–83). He concludes by suggesting that 'spaces as social texts' provide the opportunity for highlighting issues concerning identity formation in relation to questions of scale 'through the *body-home-community-city-region-national-global*' (Morgan, 2000, p. 286).

Morgan's account is a useful addition to the literature on space although it is restricted largely to the ways in which critical pedagogy might be encouraged in academic geography and depends in large measure on a 'geography of resistance' in the narrow disciplinary sense—how we might import new politicised notions of space

into school geography. This is undoubtedly an important project but the notion of 'geographies of resistance' needs to be interpreted more broadly and not restricted to one subject in the curriculum where it has obvious application. Clearly, the themes *body–home–community–city–region–national–global* may be easily pursued in other parts of the arts/humanities curriculum—in history, English, social studies, and art as much as geography.

More importantly, there is a need for theorists and practitioners in critical pedagogy to address questions concerning critical *ontologies of space* by unpacking the notion of the body, construed both in terms of the historically privileged set of mind/body and its impact on learning theory (i.e., in terms of the individual learner) and in terms of collective notions (the student body). Here the contributions of Heidegger and Foucault are of paramount importance, not simply because they provide one trajectory for a consideration of the importance of space philosophically—from an essentialising ontology of being (Heidegger) to an historical ontology of ourselves (Foucault)—but also because Foucault's opus depends crucially upon spatial concepts that he has developed in relation to institutional spaces of enclosure (the prison, the school, the clinic, the factory), to *epistemes* (and the spatialisation of knowledge and their disciplinary formation), and to the transition from disciplinary societies to societies of control (involving the postmodernisation of education—see Peters, 2001h). Geographies of resistance are geographies of the body that are intimately tied to the politics of space, to locality and to identity and identity politics. Critical pedagogical practices considered in this sense may not, therefore, be related only to contents areas and their successful prosecuting in the classroom but may indeed more properly embrace lived practices and conditions of existence. Nowhere is this more important than in the current debate concerning distance education or education on the Internet for in this most politicised of spaces questions of globalisation, the body, and the politics of identity intersect in unexpected and novel ways.